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The West’s ‘overcapacity’ narrative is economically illiterate: Josef Gregory Mahoney_我的网站

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一 |

　阿里云优惠券先领券再下单刚刚，“0元购”和高额补贴成为了过去，外卖大战不再只争价格。

二 | 8月1日，美团、京东、淘宝和饿了么均发出“休战”公告。

三 | 三家各有说辞，但核心思想一致：停止“0元购”价格战，把定价权归还商家，提升服务质量，告别非理性竞争。

Wind turbines operate at a wind farm in Burqin County, Altay Prefecture, Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, on July 25, 2026. Photo: VCG
In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future.
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected]
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实际上，早在7月18日，市场监管总局就已经约谈美团、京东、饿了么三大平台，明确“进一步规范促销行为，理性参与竞争”。

四 | 直到今天价格战终结，原因是多方面的。对消费者来说，原本打着即时零售旗号的巨头大战变成了餐饮甚至奶茶大战，让不少人直呼“再喝就要糖尿病了”“那么多没人领的奶茶快餐都浪费了”。

对平台来说，虽然数据好看了——各大外卖平台创下单日2.5亿订单的行业新高，从淘宝闪购单日8000万单到美团即时零售日订单突破1.5亿单仅用了一周时间，但它们的补贴压力也与日俱增。 而更重要的是，因为平台对补贴冲量的追求，很多商家不得不被价格战裹挟，在狂热的补贴中被挤压了生存空间。

五 | 现在，休战意味着即时零售这个模式可以告别以餐饮单量论一切的阶段，思考真正的高质量发展该怎么做。

六 | 换句话说，真正围绕即时零售展开的外卖大战2.0，才刚刚开始。商家经过混乱期，是时候开始重新思考运营模式和自身与平台的关系，比如借助私域+第三方即配来争取自主权，避免再陷入类似困境。而付出了重金的平台，则需要关注到更广阔的即时零售市场，让整个服务生态更加健康。 终结的前因：价格战负面影响明显 这场外卖大战，表面上看让市场一片火热，商家单量暴涨。然而繁荣的背后，却是餐饮的普遍亏损与平台自身的巨额投入。

一位中腰部连锁快餐品牌创始人在接受媒体虎嗅访谈时表态：“现在的致命问题是增收不增利。”外卖大战确实让他们订单量几乎翻倍，但外卖占比超过40%，但整体利润反而下降了12%以上。另一位湖南餐饮商家的体验更加直接：一杯原价15元的鲜奶拿铁，在平台补贴后消费者仅需支付6.8元。算上平台补贴，商家这一单的实际收入只剩2.36元。 中小商家玩不转，大品牌连锁店同样感觉不对劲。 西贝餐饮集团创始人贾国龙日前公开表示，外卖大战已经破坏餐饮生态。南城香创始人汪国玉则直言，“钱多赚了，我们高兴不起来”。在外卖大战阶段，西贝外卖单量占比从原本的10%-20%猛增至40%，但外卖大战带来的都是低价单；南城香也表示单日总流水在涨，但堂食并没有增长，部分门店甚至呈下降趋势。 问题就在于，商家在价格战中几乎没有选择权。 多位餐饮业主反映，平台通过算法和流量分配机制，“强制”商家参与各类补贴活动。有店主表示：“不开补贴，没有流量，店铺沉底；但参与活动又难以盈利，真正是进退两难。

七 | ” 有商家透露，在部分平台补贴活动中，商家承担了高达三分之二的补贴成本。更有商家被平台“自动”开通了补贴活动，没有拒绝的机会。这种趋势若持续下去，餐饮商家将越来越依赖平台，失去运营自主权。同样一份餐，堂食20元，外卖10元，消费者很容易就会养成通过外卖点餐的习惯。

八 | 习惯一旦形成，将来不管形式怎么变，都会有消费者转化为成为平台的顾客，而不是商家的顾客。 甚至，平台还不满足于只赚这份钱，而是自己下场争夺餐饮市场。

九 | 7月22日，某平台投入10亿元启动的自营外卖项目，号称未来目标将达到万店。它们在扩张业务边界的同时，还帮助新兴商家针对性地抢夺成熟领域的客源。

十 | 平台既是裁判又是运动员，会导致商家的生存空间将不断被挤压。而令人啼笑皆非的是，这样的竞争让平台自己也陷入了尴尬境地。高盛预计，未来12个月阿里巴巴/京东的外卖业务将亏损410亿元/260亿元，美团的EBIT将下降250亿元。平台自身也在为这场价格战付出巨大代价，以至于美团核心本地商业CEO王莆中罕见接受媒体采访，对外表示这样的外卖大战打下来全是泡沫。

十一 | 如何收场重点在给商家“赋权” 如今价格战停了下来，要减轻商家依赖平台的风险，关键点自然是打开平台之外的经营空间。中国连锁经营协会的研究表明，自建会员体系与私域渠道已成为餐饮企业转型的核心战略。

十二 | 这种手段，核心价值在于掌握客户关系的主导权。一方面，经营数据归商家所有，可以用于产品改进和精准营销，而不必担心被平台利用或出售给竞争对手；另一方面，还能形成自己可控的客户触达渠道，选择中立的第三方即时配送服务，减少对外卖平台的单一依赖。例如，瑞幸咖啡通过精细化的会员管理和社群运营，在小程序下单、顺丰同城等第三方配送的基础上，避免捆绑平台，成功培养了高频次、高忠诚度的消费群体；麦当劳和肯德基利用自有APP与小程序构建完整的会员生态，通过积分兑换、专属优惠等方式增强了用户黏性。当商家完全依赖平台配送时，不仅要承担高额的配送费用，还必须接受平台设定的各种规则。而与第三方即配合作，则可以重新掌握配送的定价权和服务标准。就像各平台外卖爆单时，外卖员会选择“多栖”获取更多订单一样，商家同样有经营多个平台、在流量分散的时代掌握主动权的需求。而当商家需要同时在美团、饿了么、京东等多个平台经营时，中立的第三方即配，恰恰可以提供统一的配送管理，降低运营复杂度。 一个典型案例是顺丰同城，它已经连续七年为瑞幸咖啡提供全渠道配送服务，同时也与麦当劳、肯德基等大型连锁品牌建立了深度合作。

十三 | 它的全渠道履约网络，为商家提供从私域小程序到外卖平台的全方位支持。

十四 | 而且，和平台强制商家接受配送规则和费用相比，第三方即配还会赋予商家更多定价自主权，根据自身需求选择不同的配送方案。如果商家有特殊品类的专业需求，比如医药的合规运输、鲜花的保鲜配送等，灵活的第三方即配也能提供更合适的方案。

十五 | 当然，推崇私域和第三方配送并不意味着完全放弃平台。成熟的商家应当采取“平台+私域+自主配送”的多元化策略，取长补短，规避风险——平台庞大的流量和精准的推荐算法，依然对获客很有意义。不过私域的个性化服务和会员权益能够增强用户黏性，而第三方即配则确保服务的一致性和可靠性，为商家赢得口碑和回头客。一切的本质仍然是产品和服务。当商家不再被动应对平台规则，而是将更多精力投入到提升产品质量、优化用户体验上时，才能在激烈的市场竞争中赢得真正的核心竞争力。 目光当长远即时零售的阵地远不止餐饮 回顾这次外卖大战，还有一个分歧点被媒体和大众捕捉到了：巨头们嘴上说要发展即时零售万亿蓝海，怎么打来打去全是餐饮奶茶“0元购”？这是一个简单的逻辑，餐饮的消费频率决定了它是即时零售的入口，只是平台显然“上头了”。

十六 | 真正高价值的、具有较强的刚需属性和复购率的商超、医药、美妆等非餐品类，反而陷入了沉默。

十七 | 为什么会发生这种情况？一方面，一日三餐作为营销的高频节点，更能触动消费者神经；而另一方面，餐饮只需要价格就能打出效果，但与餐饮的激烈价格竞争不同，非餐场景更注重的是服务质量和专业能力，靠短时间补贴很难砸得出来。外卖大战中，仅仅是超量的餐饮订单就已经让部分地区的外卖配送短时间瘫痪。如果要顺应即时零售市场扩大的趋势，进入竞争新阶段，市场就更需要第三方的参与和助力。尤其是一旦距离过远、重量偏大或物品价值较高，不管是商家还是消费者，都会更在意配送质量。

十八 | 这个时候，平台伴随餐饮等标准化需求产生的配送服务，会更难保证满足非标的、多样化的需求。而有专业解决方案和大量经验的第三方即配，则成为了补上这些需求缺口的重要力量。比如说，特殊药品配送需要温度和时效保障，生鲜要求完善的冷链系统，贵重物品则强调安全性和仪式感保障。这些差异化需求为专业配送服务商创造了竞争壁垒和利润空间，也推动即时配送行业向更高质量、更专业化的方向发展。未来，平台自配送这种自身成本高，又对商家有所捆绑的模式，可能还需要进一步和第三方配送协同，才能更好地满足市场需求。

十九 | 因为在即时零售市场扩大的背景下，第三方即配的多维度优势会越来越突出。 首先，全场景配送能力带来显著的规模效应。第三方即配可以服务于不同平台、不同品类的商家，通过统一调度系统实现运力资源的优化配置。特别是在解决“配送潮汐”问题上，第三方即配的“高峰共享、低谷复用”策略能有效平衡不同时段的订单波动，降低单位配送成本。以顺丰同城为例，其通过整合面向商家、消费者和末端配送的全场景业务，构建了覆盖“全需求、全时段、全距离”的服务网络，这样既促进了各方降本增效，又更好地夯实了自身的盈利结构。 此外，主打“万物到家”的即时零售越发展，与电商的融通程度就越深。此时，像顺丰同城这种专业物流出身的平台，还可以协同顺丰集团提供“远场近场一体”的一体化供应链方案，为商家提供从仓储、分拣到“最后一公里”配送的“一盘货、一体化履约”全链路服务。

| 这种协同优势是平台自营配送难以实现的。

| 商家有多样化需求，消费者也有多样化需求，这种情况恰如当年电商的发展。电商之所以繁荣，正是因为以顺丰、中通为代表的第三方快递与电商平台形成了良性互补关系，用不同的解决方案做基建，共同满足了行业需求。而按照商务部的统计，即时零售的增速远高于网络零售的增速，未来五年的市场规模有望翻倍增长到超过2万亿元。

| 因此，即时零售甚至有可能达到、超越快递的千亿级别单量，趋势不可逆转。 新一轮爆发，必然需要更多方案和资源来承载。民生证券就认为，市场的复杂化、需求的多元化、行业的智能化，都更利好专业的服务提供者。中立第三方即配自然会被旺盛的需求“抬”上历史舞台。一个健康、多元的即时零售生态，将在这个演变过程中逐渐完善。来源：松果财经

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